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Elke Kasimir
University of Potsdam
In order to investigate the empirical properties of focus, it is necessary
to diagnose focus (or: “what is focused”) in particular linguistic
examples. It is often taken for granted that the application of one
single diagnostic tool, the so-called question-answer test,w h i c h
roughly says that whatever a question asks for is focused in the
answer, is a fool-proof test for focus. This paper investigates one
example class where such uncritical belief in the question-answer test
has led to the assumption of rather complex focus projection rules: in
these examples, pitch accent placement has been claimed to depend on
certain parts of the focused constituents being given or not. It is
demonstrated that such focus projection rules are unnecessarily
complex and in turn require the assumption of unnecessarily
complicated meaning rules, not to speak of the difficulties to give a
precise semantic/pragmatic definition of the allegedly involved
givenness property. For the sake of the argument, an alternative
analysis is put forward which relies solely on alternative sets
following Mats Rooth's work, and avoids any recourse to givenness.
As it turns out, this alternative analysis is not only simpler but also
makes in a critical case the better predictions.
Keywords: Focus, Givenness
1 Focus diagnostics
In order to investigate the empirical properties of focus, it is necessary to
diagnose focus (or: “what is focused”) in particular linguistic examples. This
concerns typological study and corpus annotation, but also any attempt to
understand focus from a theoretical point of view. In the following, I assume,
following Jackendoff (1972), that focus corresponds to a syntactic feature, sayElke Kasimir 2
FOC, which influences interpretation and in various languages, among them
German, Turkish, English, also the placement of pitch accents.
1,2 An example:
(1) a. [she [only [likes [DP Sue]FOC]„
b. Interpretation: "She likes Sue and no one else."
c. Intonation: 'She only likes SUE', with a pitch accent on Sue.
The FOC feature of the category [DP Sue] in (1a) triggers a particular
interpretation which is depicted in (1b), and likewise constraints the intonation
in the manner described by (1c). Some relevant aspects of the involved
grammatical rules may be sketched as follows:
3,4
(2) Focus alternatives:
ƒ [Y ... X
1
FOC ... X
2
FOC ... X
n
FOC...] „
FOC =def { ƒ [Y ... Z
1 ... Z
2 ... Z
n ... ]„
|Z
i replaces X
i
FOC in Y, and ƒZ
i„ is of the same semantic type than
ƒX
i„ }
(3) 'only' and focus:
(i) ƒonly VP„
w(x) =  m.m M  ƒVP„
FOC m(w,x)  m=ƒVP„,
for some contextually determined M, |M| 2.
(ii) ƒonly S„
w =  m.m M  ƒS„
FOC m(w)  m=ƒS„,
for some contextually determined M, |M| 2.
1 Selkirk (1996) proposes that focus is expressed by a feature she calls F, but that only those
features which are not dominated by other categories with an F-feature enter semantic
interpretation. These “undominated” F-features she calls FOC-features. I have followed
this terminology in this paper, ignoring however F-features in general.
2 An alternative view which considers focus to be a morpheme is also compatible with the
discussion in this paper.
3 As usual, ƒX„ denotes the meaning of X, X being a syntactic constituent.
4 X,Y,Z etc. are intended to range over possible natural language expressions, in some
suitable sense of "possible natural language expression".Question-answer test and givenness: some question marks 3
(4) Pitch accent placement (focus on single-word constituents):
[Y ... [X w]FOC ... ], where w is a phonological word, requires a pitch
accent on w.
(2) implements the by now familiar notion of focus alternatives:
ƒ [likes SUEFOC] „
FOC ={ƒlikes Sue„, ƒlikes Bill„, ƒlikes Ann„,. . .}
(3) sketches a simple semantics for only which follows Rooth 1992 and makes
use of the concept of focus alternatives as follows:
ƒShe only likes Sue„ = She likes Sue is true and for any focus alternative
vp which lies in M, vp ƒlikes Sue„, she vp's is false.
The use of the variable M indicates that sometimes only a restricted subset of
focus alternatives plays a role for the meaning of only, as is demonstrated here:
(5) She invited Sue, Bill and Ann, but she only likes SUE.
This is most probably intended to express that of Sue, Bill and Ann, she only
likes Sue. In contexts where no salient subset of focus alternatives is made
explicit, we expect that a not-too-small set M is chosen, since such a choice
makes the use of only more informative, and it is commonly assumed that more
informative readings are pragmatically preferred, as long as they are relevant to
the hearer. (1a), when uttered out of the blue, most probably means that Sue is
the only person she likes, but still doesn't exclude that she likes her canary
Tweety, unless whether she likes Tweety or not was relevant to the hearer in the
utterance situation. Further below in this paper, a pragmatic constraint is
proposed which imposes a precise lower bound onto the size of the set M.Elke Kasimir 4
(4) formulates a prosodic constraint for single-worded focused
constituents which amounts for the case of (1) to the following:
in she likes SueFOC, Sue must carry a pitch accent.
In the general case, so the idea, there are semantic or pragmatic regularities like
(2) and (3), which determine how focus influences interpretation: focus
interpretation rules, and phonological/syntactical rules like (4) which determine
how focus influences the placement of pitch accents: focus projection rules.
5
If this picture is somehow on the right track, focus cannot be directly observed
in languages like English, but must instead be inferred from its intonational
and/or interpretative effects.
6 You hardly have any other choice than to start with
some basic insights like (2)-(4), and use them to develop hypotheses for an
extended range of both focus interpretation and focus projection phenomena. As
an example for this methodology, consider (6), looked upon from a hypothetical
initial state of knowledge represented by (2)-(4):
(6) If she only reads BOOKS all the time, her friends will forget about her.
The sentence most likely doesn't mean (7a), as one would expect from (2)-(4),
but (7b), and surely can mean (7b):
5 The term focus projection usually refers to the syntactic aspects of pitch accent placement
only; I use it here more inclusively as subsuming also any phonological aspects of focus
realization which are relevant for focus diagnostics.
6 The situation might of course be different for languages which express FOC-features by
morphological and/or syntactic means.Question-answer test and givenness: some question marks 5
(7) a. "If books are the only things she reads all the time, her friends will
forget about her."
b. "If reading books is the only thing she does all the time, her friends
will forget about her."
If (2) and (3) are roughly adequate, (7a-b) should exhibit the following FOC-
marking:
(8) a. If she only reads BOOKSFOC all the time, her friends will forget about
her.
b. If she only [reads BOOKS]FOC all the time, her friends will forget
about her.
Since (7b)/(8b) correspond to a possible reading of (6), it is reasonable to
assume that a pitch accent on the object of a VP suffices to express that the
whole VP is in focus, that way giving rise to an additional hypothesis on focus
projection, which will be something like the following :
(9) Pitch accent placement (V-O-focus):
[X ... [VP vO ] FOC ... ], where v is a verb and O its direct object, can be
realized prosodically just like [X ... [VP vO FOC] ... ].
(9) is actually an instance of the generally agreed upon projection rule the
argument projects and its particular formulation, which involves recursion,
requires for its justification a broader range of data than just (6). But it is still the
case that (9), or more general formulations, are derived in the manner just
described: start with observations of focus interpretation and focus projection in
simple examples and use them to understand the more complicated cases.
With the same line of argument as above, using example (10), we can also
derive the rule (11) which will turn out to be useful below:Elke Kasimir 6
(10) a. Although she only read three BOOKS, she was well informed.
b. Meaning to be expected iff „books“ is the focus: „Although books
were the only things she read three pieces of, she was well informed.“
c. Preferred reading: „Although three books were the only things she
read, she was well informed.“
That (10c) is a possible interpretation of (10a) suggests that the accent on books
can license a FOC-marking of three books, which is another instance of the
principle the argument projects and is formulated for the purposes of this paper
as follows:
(11) Pitch accent placement (D-N-focus):
[X ... [DP dn ] FOC ... ], where d is a determiner and n a noun, can be
prosodically realized like [X ... [DP dn FOC] ... ].
In the preceding two cases, the focus interpretation rules have been kept
constant in order to derive new projection rules. But we can also go the other
way around and investigate new focus-sensitive semantic/pragmatic phenomena,
keeping the inventory of focus projection rules constant. One case in question is
the interpretation of the sentence that is the problem whose interpretation seems
to be sensitive to the focus marking in the statement which is the antecedent of
that:
7
7 The following examples are inspired by Fred Dretske's I adviced her to steal the bicycle
(Dretske 1977).Question-answer test and givenness: some question marks 7
(12) a. SHE stole the bicycle. That is the problem.
implication: "If someone else had stolen the bicycle, that wouldn't
necessarily be a problem."
b. She stole the BIcycle. That is the problem.
implication can be:
(i) "If she had stolen something else, that wouldn't necessarily be a
problem."
or:
(ii) "If she had done something else, that wouldn't necessarily be a
problem."
According to the projection rules established so far, and (2), the following FOC-
marking should be possible for (12a-b):
(13) a. SHEFOC stole the bicycle
b. She stole [the BIcycle]FOC
c. She [stole the BIcycle]FOC
But these just give rise to the following focus alternatives according to (2):
(14) a. ƒSHEFOC stole the bicycle„
FOC
= { x stole the bicycle | x an individual }
b. ƒShe stole [the bicycle]FOC„
FOC = { she stole x | x an individual }
c. ƒShe [stole the bicycle]FOC„
FOC = { she vp'ed | vp a VP-meaning }
Seemingly, the pattern is roughly as follows: That is the problem expresses that
the preceding sentence describes the problem, whereas its focus alternatives doElke Kasimir 8
not necessarily describe a problem. The following interpretation rule captures
this:
(15) 'that is the problem' and focus:
ƒ S. That is the problem„ is true iff ƒS„ is true, and the fact that ƒS„ is true
is the problem, and any state of affairs described by some m  M 
ƒS„
FOC,m ƒS„, isn't or wouldn't be a problem, for some contextually
determined M, |M| 2.
8
What distinguishes that is the problem from only, and makes it especially useful
for the task of focus diagnostics, is that the focus-sensitive element resides
outside the sentence whose focus is to be diagnosed: whenever we want to
determine the focus of a sentence which does not already contain only,a th a n d
of only, we must first add one and that way necessarily alter the structure of the
sentence under investigation. With that is the problem, we can leave the
sentence as is.
2 Some qualifications
A not unimportant aspect of the problem of focus diagnostics lies in the fact that
the set of established rules may turn out to make the wrong predictions even for
those limited cases they are intended to capture. This section points to two
known general limitations of the particular rules proposed so far.
The first of these concerns the determination of focus alternatives as
defined in (2), has been at least in parts observed before (Rooth 1992,
8 It seems to depend on the context whether the focus alternatives are factual or
counterfactual. In (12a), the context clearly forces a counterfactual interpretation, whereas
(12b) is compatible with a reading where she actually stole something else without causing
thereby any problem.Question-answer test and givenness: some question marks 9
Bonomi&Casalegno 1993) and shows up whenever a generalized quantifier is in
focus:
9
(16) Only ƒ[few STUdents]FOC own a bicycle].
The relevant alternative set is expected from (2) to be as follows:
(17) ƒ[few STUdents]FOC own a bicycle„
FOC
={ƒdp owns a bicycle„ | dp a possible natural-language-DP }
But then the proposition expressed by the following sentence should be part of
the focus alternatives:
(18) [Everyone who owns a bicycle, if a linguist snores, otherwise someone
who doesn't own a bicycle] owns a bicycle.
But (16) just means the same as:
(19) A linguist snores.
In other words, (19) is part of the focus alternatives relevant in (16) and is
expected to show up in at least some readings of (16). It should then be possible
to use (16) and thereby entail that no linguist snores.
But the problem is more general. Since the above argument works for
arbitrary propositions, not just for the proposition that a linguist snores,
ƒ[few students]FOC own a bicycle„
FOC
will contain any proposition there is. But then it is just identical to
9 In examples like this, I attach only to the whole sentence, not just the DP for simplicity.
Nothing depends on this, as the reader is invited to check by herself.Elke Kasimir 10
ƒ[few students own a bicycle]FOC„
FOC
In other words, focus shouldn't make any difference in:
(20) a. I only want that [few STUdents]FOC own a bicycle.
b. I only want that [few STUdents to own a BIcycle]FOC.
But of course, focus does make a difference here. The problem cannot by the
way be explained away with hindsight to the contextual determination of the set
Mi nt h em e a n i n go fonly in (3), since identical contextual influences should be
operative in (20a) and (20b).
Are focus alternatives perhaps generally a bad idea, a misled intuition? I
am very convinced they aren't; I am also convinced that it will sooner or later be
possible to come to a reasonably precise understanding of the focus alternatives
being relevant in examples like (16). My optimism stems from the fact that a
rather similar problem arises in the context of the determination of the answer
set of a question: Traditionally, questions like who has a bicycle were analyzed
as either having answers like Sue has a bicycle,o rSue and no one else has a
bicycle (Groenendijk&Stokhof 1997). But there is an increasing awareness that
in some situations, statements like few students own a bicycle provide the most
natural answer to who has a bicycle. The determination of the answer set of a
question thus faces a problem which is similar to the one just described for focus
alternatives: arbitrary DP's should be able to occur in answers to questions,
without at the same time allowing arbitrary propositions as answers. As it
happens, there seems to be an increasing interest in the conditions underlying
such non-classical answer sets (Ginzburg 1996, Beck&Rullmann 1999, van
Rooy 2003). And it is likely that progress in the understanding of answer sets
will also advance the understanding of focus alternatives in complicated cases.Question-answer test and givenness: some question marks 11
For the time being, and for the limited concern of focus diagnostics, one is
however always well advised to better avoid examples where the set of focus
alternatives cannot reliably be determined. And this is just what I have tried hard
to do in this paper, as the reader will come to notice.
There is another, probably less severe limitation of the rules presented so
far. Consider:
(21) a. She only [bought a BOOK]FOC
b. She only BOUGHT a BOOK
Intended meaning in both cases: "Buying a book was all she did."
It seems that both accent patterns are possible and in more or less free variation.
But of course only the second accent on book is predicted by the rules so far, i.e.
(9) above. The role of the preceding accent on bought might actually be subject
to debate: On one possible view, this accent is a purely phonological effect that
might, for instance, depend on velocity of speech, or register. On the second
possible view, this accent is input to semantic/pragmatic interpretation and
indicates, say, some additional contrast (see Bolinger 1989, Féry 1993, Vallduví
& Zacharski 1993, Ladd 1996:223ff. for discussion and viewpoints).
A good method to circumvent potential problems arising from such
potentially mere phonological accents in focus diagnostic tasks is to always look
at the minimally required accents that allow a specific reading of a sentence. As
the reader will have noticed, the formulations of the rules (4), (9) and (11) have
been chosen such that they determine a lower limit on the pitch accents required
for a particular FOC-marking, without saying anything about the upper limit.
Other authors have explicitly or implicitly followed a similar strategy.Elke Kasimir 12
3 Question-answer test
The preceding sections may sound rather strange to someone who is accustomed
to a certain very simple method of focus diagnostics: the question-answer test.
The question-answer test relies on an allegedly both simple and uncontroversial
state of affairs, one of the “two perhaps most persistent intuitions researchers
have expressed about the background–focus distinction" according to Daniel
Büring (to appear), and can be stated as follows:
(22) Question-answer test
If a question asks for some X (X being a syntactic category), in a direct
answer to this question, the constituent which corresponds to X is
focused.
What the question-answer test promises us is that we need not bother about
subtle semantic or pragmatic differences, but can instead rely on simple,
“objective”, distributional facts: whenever a question and an intuitively “direct”
answer follow each other in discourse, we know what is focused in the answer
by looking at the question.
It is seemingly possible to, say, derive the projection rules (4), (9) and
(11) from above in an alternative way which avoids all the tricky semantic or
pragmatic issues discussed there, by just employing the question-answer test:
(23) a. „Who does she like?“ „She likes Sue!“
b. [She [likes SueFOC]]
c. Argument: Since „Sue“ corresponds to what was asked for, we know
that it is FOC-marked.Question-answer test and givenness: some question marks 13
(24) a. „What does she do?“ „She reads books!“
b. [She [reads books]
FOC]
c. Argument: Since „reads books“ corresponds to what was asked for,
we know that it is FOC-marked.
(25) a. „What did she read?“ „She read three books!“
b. [She read [three books]FOC]
c. Argument: Since „three books“ corresponds to what was asked for, we
know that it is FOC-marked.
Nice as this story sounds, the rest of this paper will show that things are not
nearly such simple: examples will be discussed where the question-answer leads
to the assumption of, so the claim, unnecessarily complex focus projection rules
and focus interpretation rules. It will finally even turn out that these complex
rules make inferior predictions in some interesting cases.
Before all this, let's have a short look on two notions which are relevant
for (22) namely that of a direct answer to a question, and that of the constituent
that is asked for, in order to make the following discussion more precise.
Consider to this point:
(26) a. Who does she like?
b. She likes SUE.
c. SHE likes SUE.
d. She DOES like Sue! (But not so much as she likes Ann)
There is little controversy that (26b) is the direct answer we are after for the sake
of the question-answer-test, whereas (26c) and (26d) should obviously not count
as direct answers, but merely as indirect ones. Many people would say that (26c)Elke Kasimir 14
is instead a direct answer to: Who likes whom?, and (26d) is a direct answer to
Does she like Sue? So one possible operational definition for the concept of
direct answer is to rely on plain intuition: A sentence is a direct answer to a
question when people agree that it is. This, I would guess, is the common view.
As for the question of what a question asks for, the idea is to look for the
syntactic constituent in the question which “replaces” in the answer the wh-
pronoun of the question. In the case of (26a-b), here repeated:
(26) a. Who does she like?
b. She likes SUE!
this means that it is a DP which is asked for in (26a), and that the DP Sue is the
suitable correspondent for it in (26b). In general:
(27) What a question asks for (who/what-questions):
A question of the form who/what VP's asks for a DP dp which makes the
sentence dp VP's true. In an answer of the form dp VP's, dp is the
syntactic constituent which corresponds to what is asked for.
It should by the way not go unnoticed that the idea that what "replaces" the wh-
constituent in the question is focused in the answer works well here, but not
necessarily in the case of (24): There, the wh-word what is a DP, but what is
asked for is commonly believed to be a VP. This shows to what extent the
believed-to-be merely "distributional" question-answer test is actually governed
by plain intuition.
We have seen now that the question-answer test promises an elegant
shortcut to focus diagnostics which apparently avoids the complicated
procedures of focus diagnostics sketched in the initial two sections of this paper.
But it will turn out soon that the question-answer test comes with a certain prize:Question-answer test and givenness: some question marks 15
it forces one two assume complicated focus projection rules which need
additional pragmatic input in form of a givenness property: the next section
demonstrates this important implication of the question-answer test. After that,
the main thesis of this paper will be formulated, which amounts to the claim that
this prize is too high and the question-answer test should be abandoned in its
role as the authoritative device for focus diagnostics. The rest of the paper will
then present arguments and facts that support this claim.
4 Givenness
Consider:
(28) Q. Who owns a bicycle?
A. This STUdent owns a bicycle!
What does the question-answer test say is focused in (28.A)? Under the
assumption that (28.A) is a direct answer to (28.Q) in the sense of the question-
answer test, and using the definition of what is asked for in (27), the answer will
clearly be that this student is focused in (28.A). This also fits our expectations,
since the accent placement in (28.A) is just as predicted by (11). All this is most
likely uncontroversial. But now consider the following:
(29) Q. As for the students: who owns a bicycle?
A. THIS student owns a bicycle!
Following the question-answer test, one is again forced to assume that in (29.A),
this student focused, since nothing that is relevant for the question-answer test
has changed. However, whereas the accent placement in (28.A) was just asElke Kasimir 16
expected, the accent on this in (29.A) isn't. How comes, and how to account for
this?
One difference between (28) and (29) perhaps worth to be considered is
that (28.Q) asks for arbitrary bicycle-owners, whereas (29.Q) is contextually
understood to specifically ask for a DP which selects from students. The
following revision of (27) acknowledges the fact that what a question asks for
might be context-dependent:
(30) What a question asks for (context-dependent variant):
A question of the form who VP's asks for a DP dp such that dp VP's is
true and fits any additional contextual restrictions onto an answer to who
VP's. In the answer dp VP's, dp is the syntactic constituent which
corresponds to what is asked for.
However, using (30) instead of (27) doesn't actually change the predictions of
the question-answer test for (29.A): It is still the DP this student which should
be focused according to the question-answer test. So the question remains how it
comes that (28.A) and (29.A) differ in their requirements on pitch accent
placement.
There seem to be only two logical possibilities: Either fix the problem
from the side of the projection rules such that these somehow predict (28.A) and
(29.A) to be different, or question the results of the question-answer test and
assume for (29.A) a FOC-marking which is compatible with the projection rules
assumed so far. The aim of this paper is to show that the second strategy is
actually viable and has some surprising advantages over the first. However,
recent literature on the topic (Selkirk 1996, Rochemont 1998, Schwarzschild
1999, Büring 2003) has unanimously voted for the first strategy, so that this
strategy will be looked upon first.Question-answer test and givenness: some question marks 17
The basic idea which is common to the just mentioned approaches (which
considerably differ in other respects) is the intuition that the crucial difference
between
[this STUdent]FOC
in (28.A) and
[THIS student]FOC
in (29.A) lies in the fact that in the latter, but not the former, student is given,o r
discourse-given. The discourse-givenness of the noun lets the the pitch accent,
so to speak, move to the left, into the only other available position, which is the
determiner this.
A projection rule which resembles (11) (=pitch accent placement / D-N-
focus), but respects givenness, can be formulated as follows:
10
(31) Intonation for determiner-noun-focus (context-sensitive variant):
[YP ... [XP dn ] FOC ... ], where d and n are phonological words, and d is a
determiner and n a noun, and where n is given, is realized by pitch
accent on the determiner d.
The notion of givenness has been around for a long time in the context of focus
and information structure (see for instance Halliday 1967, Chafe 1976, Allerton
1978), but its precise context has often been left open. Somehow prominent is
the idea to compare givenness to the notion of familiarity which plays a role in
anaphora resolution and the licensing of indefinites, or to say that given things
are presupposed. A third approach which has been proposed by Roger
10See Selkirk 1996, Rochemont 1998, Schwarzschild 1999, Büring 2003. The rule systems
proposed there are of course much more general and sophisticated.Elke Kasimir 18
Schwarzschild (1999) relates the givenness of an expression to the fact that a
related linguistic expression, for instance an identical expression, has been
previously uttered in discourse. For the case of student in (29.A), these three
ideas would amount roughly to the following:
(32) student is given iff:
a. There is a set of students pre-established in the context to which
student is anaphorically related.
b. student comes with an existential presupposition such that this student
owns a bicycle is infelicitous instead of plainly wrong in case there are
no students.
c. A linguistic expression which is synonymous to student has already
been mentioned in the context.
All of these conditions seem to be fulfilled in (29.A). The question-answer test,
that is (22) and (27), or alternatively (30), together with the modified projection
rule (31) and one of the characterizations of givenness in (32a-c), therefore
correctly predict the accent pattern in (29.A).
5 The main thesis
Let's summarize: after the first two sections have portrayed focus diagnostics as
a rather tricky issue in languages like English, due to the fact that the syntactic
FOC-marking is not directly observable in these languages, the third section
offered a comfortable shortcut: just look at question-answer pairs and let the
question-answer test decide on FOC-marking. The preceding section however
demonstrated the cost of this move: projection rules must be assumed which are
more complicated and involve reference to additional pragmatic input, namely
givenness.Question-answer test and givenness: some question marks 19
The main thesis of this paper now amounts to the claim that this prize
need not be paid and is perhaps too high. It will be demonstrated that an analysis
is possible which allows for simpler projection rules which do not make use of
givenness, with equal if not superior empirical properties, if only the question-
answer test is abandoned. The central idea can be illustrated at hand of the
problematic example (29.A), here repeated:
(29) Q. As for the students: Who owns a bicycle?
A. THIS student owns a bicycle!
Whereas the question-answer test predicts this student to be in focus here,
simpler projection and interpretation rules obtain if one simply assumes this to
be in focus here, in accord to (4), the projection rule for single-word focus from
the first section. This will be demonstrated in the next section.
The remaining sections make frequent use of the just mentioned
competing analysis of (29.A) - focus on this student versus focus on this -i n
order put forward various arguments in favor of the second option: section 6
demonstrates that an alternative approach to focus in answers can be formulated
which just predicts focus on this in (29.A) and does so without any recourse to
givenness. Section 7 shows that focus projection rules which respect givenness,
like (31) above, in turn require interpretation rules which also respect givenness.
That the relevant pragmatic concept of givenness cannot be easily made precise
will be argued for in section 8. Sections 9 and 10 finally show that projection
which respect givenness, together with interpretation rules which respect
givenness, even make the inferior predictions in critical examples.Elke Kasimir 20
6 An alternative analysis to focus in answers
The preceding section demonstrated that in order to stick to the predictions of
the question-answer test in examples like:
(29) Q. As for the students: Who owns a bicycle?
A. THIS student owns a bicycle!
special amendments to the focus projection rules are necessary and have indeed
been proposed in the literature, which rely on additional pragmatic input in the
form of a givenness property. This section investigates the alternative option:
ignore the question-answer test and instead keep the projection rules simple. At
the core of this endeavor lies the idea to re-analyze (29.A) as involving narrow
focus on this:
(33) THISFOC student owns a bicycle.
The obligatory pitch accent on this now follows immediately from the projection
rules assumed so far, i.e. (4) (intonation for single-word focus). However, as
was explained in detail above, the FOC-marking in (33) contradicts the
predictions of the question-answer test, which consequently must be assumed to
be invalid for examples like (29.A). As a substitute, this section proposes an
alternative pragmatic rule for focus in answers to questions which just predicts
the following FOC-marking:
(28')Q: Who owns a bicycle?
A: [This STUdent]FOC owns a bicycle.Question-answer test and givenness: some question marks 21
(29')Q: As for the students: Who owns a bicycle?
A: THISFOC student owns a bicycle.
This alternative analysis of focus in answers will be based on focus alternatives -
no separate notion of givenness is involved. In total, this section thus
demonstrates that there is actually no real need for complicated givenness-
related projection rules if one is willing to give up the unrestricted validity of the
question-answer test as a pre-theoretic tenet.
The alternative rule for focus in answers to questions proposed now is not
actually new but basically just combines the familiar approach to this very issue
in Rooth 1992 with an additional constraint on focus interpretation which was
apparently already present in a paper by Roger Schwarzschild (1992).
11 It goes
as follows:
(34) Focus in Answers to questions (preliminary formulation):
An answer A to a question Q must be FOC-marked such that ƒA„
FOC is a
minimal superset of the contextually appropriate answers to Q.
The key idea is to explain the difference in FOC-marking between (28.A) on the
one hand, (29.A) on the other hand, with the different size of the contextually
appropriate answer sets of (28.Q), (29.A) resp. Whereas (28.Q) expects as an
answer just x owns a bicycle for some arbitrary x, (29.Q) just expects an answer
x owns a bicycle, where x is restricted to be a student. The intuition that the set
of contextually appropriate answers is limited in this manner for (29.A) was
already mentioned above and taken there as an opportunity to formulate (30).
However, it turned out that this doesn't change the predictions of the question-
11Here cited after Truckenbrod 1995. The original text was not available to the author at the
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answer test. Principle (34) on the other hand links the size of the contextually
salient answer set to the FOC-marking in the answer by way of the alternative
sets generated by the latter. It states that differences in the size of the answer sets
should be reflected in the size of the focus alternatives of the resp. answers. Let's
assume that these are the relevant sets:
(35) a. contextually appropriate answers to (28.Q):
{ x owns a bicycle | x an individual }
b. contextually appropriate answers to (29.Q):
{ x is one of the students and owns a bicycle | x an individual }
c. ƒ [This STUdent]FOC owns a bicycle „
FOC:
{ x owns a bicycle | x an individual }
d. ƒ THISFOC student owns a bicycle „
FOC:
{ x is a student and owns a bicycle | x an individual }
Both (35c) and (35d) are supersets of (35b), but (35d) is the smaller one. Since
(34) requires the focus alternatives to be minimal, the FOC-marking which
generates the smaller alternative set, which is (35d), must be chosen for (29.Q).
However, since (35a) has only (35c) as a superset - (35d) being too small - the
FOC-marking which generates (35a) is chosen for (28.Q). This is the idea
behind (34) which will be made more precise shortly.
One point that deserves explanation and should perhaps be clarified first
is how the resp. alternative sets (35c) and (35d) are actually obtained. For the
case of (35c) this is rather simple: it is assumed that this student is a directly
referring expression which just contributes an individual to the interpretation,
just like Sue or her. In the case of (35d), the matter is a bit more complicated: in
order to align to the analysis of this student as a referring expression, it is
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student) into an individual such that the individual referred to is in every world
of evaluation the same. As a result, this, combined with student, is in fact a
directly referring expression which denotes this student irrespective of the world
of evaluation.
The following definition captures this:
(36) Meaning and type of 'this':
(i) this N selects for any world w from the individuals who satisfy N in w
just one individual the speaker of this N intends to refer to (and,
perhaps points the hearer to extra-linguistically). this N can be thought
of as being n-way ambiguous, where n=| ƒN„ |, and where the
particular reading is contextually disambiguated at hand of the
intentions of the speaker.
(ii) The type of this is the set of functions f such that i=f(w,p(w)) for
every world w and 1-place-predicate intension p, i an individual, and
such that p(i) holds and f is constant in its first argument.
According to this definition, the type of this is identical to the set of all its
different readings: For the sake of focus alternatives, this, as used to refer to this
student, has as its alternative again this, this time used to refer to that student,
and so forth. This gives us alternatives which range over the set of all students.
Notice again that this approach to the meaning and type of this is just consistent
with the treatment of this student as a directly referential term in the calculation
of the focus alternatives in (35c). Readers who would prefer to include the
whole range of determiners: a, few, many etc. into the focus alternatives of this
should consequently also include ap r o f e s s o r , few teachers,a n dmany students
into the focus alternatives of this student. But then, the set of the focus
alternatives will just explode to include any proposition, as has been shown in
section 2 above. The solution presented here seems to me to be both intuitively
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quantifiers when fed into the meaning rule (2) (Def. ƒ.„
FOC) from the first
section.
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Let's now return to the alternative account for focus in answers which was
formulated in a preliminary fashion in (34) above. The following presents this
account in a more explicit fashion and also derives it from a rather general
principle of focus interpretation, called minimize FOC-marking here:
(37) Focus in answers to question (a bit more precise):
(i) Let Q
ANS be the set of contextually appropriate direct answers to Q:
(ii) ƒQ„
ANS =M ƒA„
FOC for any answer A to Q, for some suitable M.
12More can be said to the meaning of this as described in (36) and the the resulting focus
alternatives:
(i) (36) is a simplification in that it does not distinguish between interpretation against
the world of evaluation, and interpretation against the utterance context. It does
furthermore not distinguish between presupposed and asserted parts of an utterance
containing this.
(ii) What has been described as the semantic type of this in (36.ii) which effectively
constraints ƒthisFOC„
FOC is perhaps better understood as constraints resulting directly from
the semantic types, and constraints on possible natural language expressions (see footnote
4 above), i.e. conservativity of determiners, which leads to the requirement thatƒthis N„ 
ƒN„. This still doesn't explain why the focus alternatives of this N are rigid designators, and
perhaps they just aren't. In this case, the members of ƒMary„
FOC probably aren't rigid
designators either. A lot of technical details would change, but as far as I can see, nothing
relevant to the line of argument presented in this paper.
(iii) As an alternative to the assumption of a rather restricted semantic type of this, one
might assume that what actually is focused in THIS student owns a bike is not the whole
meaning of this, but only a part. Compare to this end he WENT there , where focus on the
verb can optionally express focus on tense.
All this is interesting in its own right, but should not affect any arguments presented in
the text. What is crucial for the argumentation is firstly that ƒthisFOC N„
FOC  ƒ[this
N]FOC„
FOC holds, and secondly that ƒthisFOC N„
FOC restricts alternatives to members of N in
a way that ƒ[this N]FOC„
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(38) Minimize FOC-marking:
X, X being a syntactic structure inclusive FOC-marking of some
sentence or text, is disambiguated to mean some m such that there is no
grammatical structure Y in the same language which differs from X only
in FOC-marking such that Y
FOC X
FOC and Y can be disambiguated to
have the same meaning m, where meaning includes both propositional
content and contextual restrictions. "Disambiguation" in this definition
means the choice of suitable subsets M of the focus alternatives.
(38) effectively imposes a lower bound on the sets M in each of the definitions
(3), (15) and (37a) such that the condition M  [...]
FOC which is found in every
of these definitions is strengthened to the condition that the resp. [...]
FOC must be
the minimal superset of M which can be expressed in that language by
distributing FOC-features over the syntactic structure without changing it in
other ways. Although this principle was introduced here in the context of focus
in answers, it is formulated as a more general claim. And this seems to be
justified. Just as an example, consider:
(39) a. Mary [stole a BIcycle]FOC. That is the problem.
b. Mary STOLEFOC a bicycle. That is the problem.
c. Mary stole a BIcycleFOC. That is the problem.
From principle (38), it follows that (39a) may not get an interpretation that could
also be expressed by (39b) or (39c). Consider for instance, an interpretation
which is based on the following choice of M:
M={Mary stole a bicycle, Mary bought a bicycle}
Such M might be intended in a context where Mary was expected to buy a
bicycle when she actually stole it. Both (39a) and (39b) are compatible with thisElke Kasimir 26
interpretation. But then, by principle (38), only (39b) will actually receive it,
since it has the smaller alternative set. This reading is thus expected to be
actually unavailable for (39a). And this just seems to fit the facts: We can (39a)
use only when we want to contrast Mary's stealing the bicycle with a more
general set of behavioral options. If we want just contrast Mary's stealing the
bicycle with buying the bicycle, we have to use (39b).
What is so nice is that (38) can be thought of as an instantiation of the
Gricean quantity maxim: If the speaker had had some M  X
FOCin mind which
could be better approximated by some FOC-marking variant Y
FOC, she should
have chosen to utter Y. This in turn let's the hearer assume that there is no such
Y.
It is hard to deny that the just presented analysis is simple and extends the
basic observation of focus projection and focus interpretation in a natural and
straightforward way. This section started with the proposal that (29), here
repeated,
(29) Q. As for the students: Who owns a bicycle?
A. THIS student owns a bicycle!
should be analyzed with a narrow focus on this instead of wide focus on this
student, as was predicted by the question-answer test. It turns out now that such
a re-analysis is not only possible, but perhaps even to be preferred, since no
additional input in form of givenness must be invoked for the explanation of the
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7 Givenness in interpretation
In the last section the possibility has been discussed that focus in answers to
questions may be narrower than is usually assumed. In (29.A), here again
repeated:
(29) Q: As for the students: Who owns a bicycle?
A: THIS student owns a bicycle.
the assumption of narrow focus on this, instead of wide focus on this student,
contradicts the question-answer test but allows for a simpler focus projection
rule. This section will argue that the simpler focus projection rule also helps to
keep the interpretation rules simple. Or to put it the other way around: it will
turn out that projection rules which involve givenness in turn require
interpretation rules which also involve givenness. Two examples will be
discussed to this end which are closely related to (29.A), the first of which being
the following:
(40) Q: As for the students: Who owns a bicycle?
A: Only THIS student owns a bicycle.
implication: No other student owns a bicycle, and nothing is said about
non-students.
The contribution of only to the interpretation of (40.A) amounts just to the claim
that no other student owns a bicycle except the one denoted by this student.I ti s
not excluded that there might be other, non-student owners of a bicycle. As itElke Kasimir 28
turns out, exactly this meaning is predicted by (2) (Def. ƒ.„
FOC)a n d( 3 )( = only
and focus) if we assume (40.A) to be the following:
13
(41) Only [S THISFOC student owns a bicycle]
As was discussed at length in the previous section, this leads to the following
focus alternatives for the embedded S:
ƒ [S [THISFOC student] owns a bicycle] „
FOC =
{ x is a student and owns a bicycle | x an individual }
A c c o r d i n gt o( 3 . i i )( = only and focus), the meaning of (40.A) is then:
(42) 	 w. m.m M  { x is a student and owns a bicycle
| x an individual } mi st r u ei nw m=this student owns a bicycle.
This well corresponds to what has just been described to be the meaning of
(40.A): in all alternatives, the bicycle-owner is a student. Bad news for everyone
who considers the complement of only in (40.A) to be a direct answer to the
question (40.Q) in the sense of the question-answer test. Since in this case, one
had to assume instead wide focus:
Only [S [THIS student]FOC owns a bicycle]
This of course suggests the following bigger set of focus alternatives:
(43) ƒ [S [THIS student]FOC owns a bicycle] „
FOC =
{ x owns a bicycle | x an individual }
13only is again taken as having scope over the whole sentence in order to simplify the
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According to (3.ii), the meaning of (40.A) which obtains now is:
(44) 	 w.  m.m M  { x owns a bicycle | x an individual }
 mi st r u ei nw m=this student owns a bicycle.
Other than (42), (44) predicts that a reading of (40.A) is available which just
says that this student is the only person who owns a bicycle. only doesn't range
anymore exclusively over students, but over individuals in general. If one
furthermore assumes that (38) (= minimize FOC-marking) above is correct, such
a stronger reading is even enforced. So it seems that the assumption of narrow
focus, as in (41), fits the facts much better here than the wide focus predicted by
the question-answer test.
This is not of course already a conclusive argument against the question-
answer test: firstly, one could reply that the embedded This student owns a
bicycle has indeed narrow focus on this in (40.A), but is not a direct answer to
(40.Q) and thus need not obey the question-answer test. Since the concept of a
direct answer is purely intuitive, it is hard to argue for or against such a move.
Secondly, one could argue that (2) (Def. ƒ.„
FOC), or the deployed semantics of
only, as given by (3.ii), is not appropriate for the cases in question: perhaps, the
fact that student is given in the context of (40.A) influences not only the accent
placement, but also either the focus alternatives, or the meaning rule of only.I n
order to save the question-answer test, one had to find a re-formulation of these
interpretation rules such that they respect the givenness status of the constituents
of the focused phrase.
The following sketches how such a reformulation of (2) (Def. ƒ.„
FOC)
could look like:Elke Kasimir 30
(45) Focus alternatives (variant which respects givenness):
ƒ [Y ... X
1
FOC ... X
2
FOC... X
n
FOC... ] „
FOC ={ƒ [Y ... Z
1 ... Z
2 ... Z
n ... ] „ |Z
i
replaces X
i
FOC in Y, ƒZ
i„ is of the same semantic type than ƒX
i„, and for
every Kgiven which occurs somewhere inside of some X
i
FOC the
following holds: Any substitute Z
i for [X
i ... Kgiven ... ] must have the
form [Z
i ... Kgiven . . .] ,w h e r eK given occupies equivalent structural
positions in X
i and Z
i.}
For instance:
ƒ [S [THIS studentgiven]FOC owns a bicycle] „
FOC
={ ƒ [Z A student] owns a bicycle „ | for some suitable A and Z}
={ x is a student and owns a bicycle | x an individual }
As a result of this modification, the following two structures now generate
identical focus alternatives:
[this studentgiven]FOC owns a bicycle
[thisFOC student owns a bicycle]
(45) therefore allows one to stick to the prediction of the question-answer test
that this student is in focus in (40.A), and at the same time obtain an
interpretation which behaves as if only this was in focus.
To summarize: Examples like (40) can be made consistent with the
question-answer test by either claiming that this student owns a bicycle in (40.A)
is not an answer to (40.Q) and has narrow focus on this, or by the assumption of
more complicated focus interpretation rules which respect givenness.
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(46) Q: As for the students: Who owns a bicycle?
A: THIS student owns a bicycle. That is the problem.
intuitive meaning: That this student owns a bicycle is the problem, and
when some other student owned a bicycle, that wouldn't necessarily be a
problem. Nothing is said about non-students who own a bicycle.
It again turns out that the assumption of narrow focus on this just gives the right
meaning under the already established focus interpretation rules (2) (Def. ƒ.„
FOC)
and (15) (=that is the problem and focus). The focus alternatives are of course
just as before:
ƒ [S [THISFOC student] owns a bicycle] „
FOC =
{ x is a student and owns a bicycle | x an individual }
(15) says that there is a salient subset M of these alternatives, such that any state
of affairs described by some m  M obtained, this state of affairs wouldn't be a
problem. Since M is a subset of the focus alternatives, under any possible choice
of M, these factual or counterfactual states of affairs always involves students
who own bicycles. It is thus predicted that (46.A) says nothing about bicycle-
owning non-students. But this just meets the intuitive meaning of (46.A).
In an analysis which assumes wide focus on this student and the usual
focus interpretation rules from the first section of the paper, the set of focus
alternatives is considerably larger:
ƒ [S [THIS student]FOC owns a bicycle] „
FOC =
{ x owns a bicycle | x an individual }Elke Kasimir 32
The contextually determined subset M postulated in (15) may in this case also
contain states of affairs where non-students own a bicycle, and will contain them
if (37) is correct. However, (46.A) does not seem to have a reading where
anything is said about non-students owning a bicycle.
As in the previously discussed example - (40) - one of the following arguments
can be put forward in order to save the question-answer test: (i) (46.A) is not a
direct answer to (46.Q) in the sense of the question-answer test, and in (46.A)
there is a narrow focus on this, or (ii) the relevant focus interpretation rules are
in fact sensitive to givenness, and the problem is just that the rules deployed
here, (2) and/or (15), actually need to be revised.
However, argument (i) is much less convincing in the case of this second
example, since (46.A) just feels, smells and tastes like a direct answer to (46.Q).
If it wasn't, this would certainly also constitute a strong argument against the
question-answer test, if not with respect to its validity, so at least with respect to
its practical applicability.
So the only remaining counter-argument is (ii), which amounts to the
claim that the relevant focus interpretation rules must be made sensitive to
givenness, for instance in the way that was depicted in (45) (=focus alternatives
which respect givenness). Since such more complicated interpretation rules can
also be avoided, as has been shown above, (46.A) clearly supports the main
claim of this section: that the assumption of the validity of the question-answer
test leads not only to unnecessarily complex focus interpretation rules, but also
to unnecessarily complex focus projection rules.
8 A closer look onto Givenness
In the previous three sections, two alternative analysis have been proposed for
(29.A), here again repeated:Question-answer test and givenness: some question marks 33
(29) Q: As for the students: Who owns a bicycle?
A: THIS student owns a bicycle.
According to one of them, the accent in (29.A) falls on this because the
otherwise preferred target student counts as given. The competing analysis does
without any recourse to givenness. Considerable weight lies now on the
following question: How easy is it to precisely define the relevant givenness
property involved in the first analysis? This section presents three examples
which demonstrate that finding such a definition will be far from being
straightforward. These examples are closely related to the examples discussed so
far. The whole problem cannot of course be captured by three examples. But it is
to be expected that the problems merely increase if a larger empirical domain is
being considered.
The idea that student is given in (29.A) draws its initial plausibility from
the fact that students have already been mentioned in the previous utterance as
for the students in (29.Q). Without this preceding as for the students, the accent
would fall onto student instead of this in this example. But what exactly lets as
for the students make student given? Three plausible characterizations of the
relevant relationship were formulated in section 4:
(32) student is given iff:
a. There is a set of students pre-established in the context to which
student in this student is anaphorically related.
b. student comes with an existential presupposition such that this student
owns a bicycle is infelicitous instead of plainly wrong in case there are
no students.
c. A linguistic expression which is synonymous to student has already
been mentioned in the context.Elke Kasimir 34
(32a-c) each pick out some observable relation between students in (29.Q) and
student in (29.A). They furthermore enumerate the three ways in which
givenness,o rdiscourse-givenness, has been characterized in the literature:
givenness has been related there to the properties of being familiar,b e i n g
presupposed, and/or being previously mentioned.
14 As was already mentioned
before, (32c) roughly corresponds to the formal treatment of givenness in
Schwarzschild (1999), whose precise content can be summarized for the case of
student as follows:
(47) student is given iff a linguistic expression e has been uttered which
translates into an open (not necessarily first-order) logical expression E
with (after appropriate bijective renaming) free variables x1,x 2,. . . ,
xn,(n
0) and a free world variable w such that
	 w. x1...xn . E contextually entails (	 w. x . student(w,x)
For the case of example (29) this amounts of course to (32c): The antecedent
students in (29.Q) is a suitable antecedent for student in (29.A), since 	 w. X.
students(X) logically and thus contextually entails 	 w. x. students(x).
Assuming that one of (32a-c) is the correct characterization of the givenness
property which influences focus projection, the resp. version should also be able
to predict de-accentuation in closely related examples. But as the examples now
being discussed suggest, neither does. Consider first:
14Given material has also been characterized in a fourth way, namely as corresponding to
those parts of a sentence which are not focused, and are thus common to all focus
alternatives. Analysing the givenness status of student in (29.A) in this manner of course
just fits to the alternative analysis proposed above in section 6 were in (29.A) narrow focus
on this was assumed. For the context of this paper and especially this section, the issue is
however whether some separate property of givenness is needed in addition to the focus-
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(48) Q. As for the students and the professors: Who owns a bicycle?
A1. ?THIS student owns a bicycle. And no one else!
A2. This STUdent owns a bicycle. And no one else!
(48.A2), with an accent on student, is clearly possible here and for my intuition
also the only direct answer to (48.Q), whereas (48.A1) becomes appropriate only
to the extent that talk is restricted to students by way of additional contextual
conditions. But at the same time, all three conditions (32a-c) are satisfied, so that
student should count as given here in any case.
15
It is remarkable that in this example neither the alleged antecedent
students nor the alleged anaphoric element student seem to have significantly
changed w.r.t. example (29). The change instead consists of the presence of
additional material, namely the professors. Anyone who insists that the
difference between (29.A) and (48.A2) is due to an anaphoric relationship
between students and student in (48.A2) must eventually be able to account for
such indirect influences on the licensing conditions of these anaphoric links.
As it turns out, the alternative approach to focus in answers (section 6 :
37/38) which is based on the concept of focus alternatives provides an
alternative explanation for the accent placement in (48.A2). In order to see this,
have a look at the relevant contextually appropriate answers: in the case of
(29.Q), these should be just about students who own a bike, whereas in (48.A2),
answers might also be about professors who own a bike. Since according to
15The supplement and no one else was added to the answers in (48.A2) and (48.A2) in order
to signal that these are intended to provide complete utterances. This kind of explicit
disambiguation was felt to be necessary since the introduction of the complex topic the
student and the professors triggers the expectation of a more complex answer of which the
sentence under discussion would then only be the first part. And no one else is intended to
block a reading of this student owns a bicycle as a conversational turn which is
incompletely reproduced here. I thank Thomas Wescott for hinting me to this problem.Elke Kasimir 36
(37), the focus alternatives of the answer have to be supersets of the answer set,
(48.A2) is ruled out.
Consider next:
(49) Q. Since the students arrived here and brought their bicycles with them,
three bicycles were stolen. Who stole the bicycles?
A1.?THIS student stole the bicycles.
A2. This STUdent stole the bicycles.
For my very impression, (49.A1) is only appropriate if the speaker of the
question who stole the bicycles is in the context understood to believe that one of
the students must have stolen the bicycle. In a more neutral situation, only
(49.A2) is appropriate.
On the other hand, student counts again as given according to (32a-c) and
is therefore predicted to be de-accented.
16 And again, the alternative approach to
focus in answers (section 6: 37/38) just predicts the correct accent placements
here: If the contextually salient answer set excludes non-student thieves,
(49.A1), the answer with the smaller set of focus alternatives is predicted. If the
contextually salient answer set is more general, the FOC-marking found in
(49.A2) is predicted.
Consider finally:
(50) Q. As for the students: Who owns a bicycle?
A1.??TWO students own a bicycle.
A2. TWO STUdents own a bicycle.
16Condition (32a) is only satisfied if this student is one of the students referred to by the
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It is again the answer with an accent on supposedly given material which is to be
preferred in this case, i.e. (50.A2). Interestingly, (50.A1), the answer where
students is de-accented, is intuitively understood as an answer to:
(51) How many students own a bicycle?
Assume for the moment that the FOC-marking in (50.A1) was as follows:
(52) TWOFOC students own a bicycle.
That (50.A1)/(52) is well understood as an answer to (51), but not easily
understood as an answer to (50.Q) could be explained by the assumption that
two actually denotes a numeral which can only be replaced by other numerals,
not by this, few, many, every or the like. In this case the relevant focus
alternatives were as follows:
(53) ƒTWOFOC students own a bicycle„
FOC
= { n students own a bicycle | n a cardinal }
But this set is only a superset of the answer set of (51), not one of (50.A1), even
if the latter was restricted to ask for students. The alternative theory of focus
(section 6: 37/38) can therefore at least explain why (50.A1) is infelicitous. It
can of course not readily explain the peculiar accent pattern in (50.A1). Perhaps,
a better understanding of focused generalized quantifiers and the alternative sets
generated by them will provide for a satisfying analysis of these examples (see
the discussion in section 2). It is on the other side not clear how a givenness-
based explanation for this example should look like.
Three examples have been presented now which present each an empirical
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shown that these examples are at the same time amenable to an analysis in terms
of focus alternatives, at least to a certain extent. The range of de-accenting
phenomena which have been explained with givenness in the literature is of
course much bigger, so that the observations just presented merely scratch the
surface of the problem. They nevertheless hopefully suffice to show that the task
to pin down the alleged givenness property such that it allows for reliable
predictions will not be a straightforward task. This imposes a considerable
burden on the proponents of a givenness-based account and demonstrates that
the complications induced by projection rules and interpretation rules which
respect givenness are far from being trivial.
I would like to add that when working on givenness in the second half of
the year 2004 and discussing various issues with colleagues, I had the very
impression that the validity of the concept of givenness was never put to scrutiny
simply because everyone takes it for granted that one cannot do without it
anyway. If this was true, counterexamples were of course not of so much
interest: they just indicated work that still has to be done. I however hope to
present convincing arguments in this paper that the situation actually isn't this
way: especially if one is willing to abandon the unrestricted validity of the
question-answer test for focus diagnostics, alternative elegant ways show up for
the analysis of focus and accent placement which do not make use of givenness.
Whether a precise and empirically satisfying characterization of givenness is
possible therefore may turn well out to be a crucial factor in deciding between
theories of focus.
9 Focus projection and constituency
Two competing analysis have been under discussion for this student in (29.A):Question-answer test and givenness: some question marks 39
(29) Q. As for the students: Who owns a bicycle?
A. THIS student owns a bicycle!
which can be depicted as follows:
(i) [this studentgiven ]FOC
(ii) [thisFOC student]
These two analysis have been compared from different perspectives, and the
second analysis has been claimed to be superior because of its greater simplicity
given that it doesn't involve givenness and related complications. However, no
examples have been discussed so far where the empirical predictions of both
approaches clearly and unanimously diverge. The last two sections of this paper
are dedicated to such examples.
The structures (i) and (ii) are hard to distinguish because they trigger the
same accent pattern and also the same interpretation. The latter of course only
with suitable stipulations: the modified rule (45) for the computation of focus
alternatives in chapter 7 basically states that given material, although being
focused, just behaves like unfocused material for the sake of interpretation.
It is however possible to construct examples where either accent
placement or interpretation are expected to differ according to the two
competing lines of analysis, even if rules like the just mentioned (45) are
deployed. One structure with this desirable property is:
(54) [VP v[ DPd Ngiven]]FOC
In order to re-analyze this structure such that given material is actually not part
of the focus, two FOC-features must be assumed:Elke Kasimir 40
(55) [VP vFOC [DP dFOC N]]
As it turns out, for this latter structure the projection rules predict two accents,
one onto the verb and the other on the determiner, by projection rule (4) (=focus
on single words). For (54) on the other hand, one accent on the determiner d
should suffice according to the projection rules (9) (V-O focus) and (31) (D-N
focus).
A test situation where one would expect a structure like (54) consists of
an answer to a question which asks for a VP, plus additional contextual material
that makes N given. In order to construct such a test case we first need to know
what kind of questions ask for a VP - up to now, we have always used questions
which ask for a DP. The following seems to be widely accepted in the literature:
(56) What a question asks for - VP meanings:
The question what did x do?, ƒx„ an individual, asks for a VP-meaning.
As an example, take:
(57) Q: What did Mary do?
A : S h e[ s t o l eaB I c y c l e ] FOC! That's the problem.
implication: If she did something else, that wouldn't necessarily be a
problem. Nothing is said about someone else doing something.
The pitch accent in (57.A) is well explained by (56) in combination with (9), the
focus projection rule for VP's, and (11), the focus projection rule for DP's with
no given constituents. That the VP is in focus is independently confirmed by the
semantic effect of that's the problem: The focus alternatives of (57.A) are:
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According to (15), the meaning rule of that is the problem, (57.A) should
express that some significant subset of these focus alternatives describe
something that isn't a problem. This just seems to fit the intuitive meaning.
Now consider the following context:
(58) Q: As for the bicycles: what did Mary do?
A: She stole this bicycle.
In this context, the question asks for a VP-meaning, and bicycle is at the same
time given. The answer thus just instantiates (54):
(59) She [VP stole [this bicyclegiven]]FOC
Now it seems as if (58.A), to the extent that one is willing to de-accent bicycle in
the first place, strongly prefers the following accent pattern:
(60) She STOLE THIS bicycle.
The accent on the verb is certainly indispensable here. But this just fits a re-
analysis along the lines of (55):
[VP stoleFOC [thisFOC bicycle]]
The analysis depicted in (59) which follows (54) would instead predict that the
accent on the verb can be omitted. So it seems that in this case, the re-analysis
along the lines of (55) is not only simpler, but also makes the better prediction.
The following two examples do not use the question-answer test, but instead
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(61) As for the bicycles: Mary only stole THIS bicycle.
In this case the competing analyses are the following:
(62) a. Mary only [stole THIS bicyclegiven]FOC.
b. Mary only stole THISFOC bicycle.
I again assume for simplicity that only has actually scope over the whole
sentence for the sake of interpretation. In order to be fair, the focus alternatives
in (62a) are computed with the help of (45) from section 7 above such that they
respect givenness. In that case (roughly):
(63) ƒ [Mary [stole this bicyclegiven]FOC] „
FOC
 ƒ [Mary stoleFOC thisFOC bicycle] „
FOC
 { Mary (does/did/will do) x with y | x an activity, y a bicycle }
For (62b) the set of focus alternatives is considerably smaller:
(64) ƒMary stole thisFOC bicycle„
FOC = { Mary stole x | x a bicycle }
The crucial difference becomes clear: The alternatives in (62a) can involve
different verb meanings, where the verb in (62b) is fixed in all alternatives to be
stole.
This difference should influence the contribution of only: According to
(62a), (61) is predicted to mean that stealing this bicycle is the only activity that
Mary performs which is directed towards one of the bicycles. According to
(62b), (61) is predicted to mean that this bicycle is the only one that Mary stole.
Nothing is said about any non-stealing activities from the side of Mary. It seemsQuestion-answer test and givenness: some question marks 43
to be obvious to me that the second interpretation is the only one which is
available for (61).
The same line of argument can be performed at hand of that is the
problem:
(65) As for the bicycles: Mary stole THIS bicycle. That is the problem.
with the competing analyses:
(66) a. Mary [stole THIS bicyclegiven]FOC.
b. Mary stole THISFOC bicycle.
The focus alternatives are the same as above. According to (66b), (67) means
that if Mary stole or had stolen some other bicycle, that wouldn't necessarily be
a problem. Nothing is said about other activities from the side of Mary.
According to (66b) however, (68) means that if Mary had done something with
one or the other bicycles, that wouldn't necessarily be a problem. It seems again
to be obvious to me that the first interpretation is the only one which is available
for (66).
10 Focus and PP-Extraction
This concluding section further extends the discussion of the preceding section.
A famous example by Lisa Selkirk will be discussed which apparently speaks
against the results from the last section. It however turns out that this example
can and must be re-analyzed. Under this re-analysis, it fits very well to the
examples obtained so far, and the main thesis defended in this paper.
Consider first the following VP:Elke Kasimir 44
(69) [VP stole THIS bicycle]
As was discussed at length above, according to a givenness-based analysis, the
pitch accent on this should be able here to license focus on the VP in suitable
circumstances, since it instantiates the following structure:
(54) [VP v[ dN given]]FOC
According to the alternative line of analysis proposed in this paper, (69) just
licenses narrow focus on the determiner this:
(55) [VP v[ d FOC N]]
The last section presented some empirical observations which indicated that the
structure depicted in (54) is actually not available.
Basically the same situation occurs with nominal phrases which take a
PP-complement. In a configuration [d N PP]FOC, the accent is commonly
assumed to fall by default onto the complement of the preposition, as is
demonstrated here:
17
(70) Q: What did Mary buy?
A: Mary bought [a book about BATS]FOC
Consider now the VP in:
(71) Mary [VP bought a BOOK about bats]
17This is again an instance of the projection principle the argument projects - see section 1.Question-answer test and givenness: some question marks 45
A c c o r d i n gt oagivenness-based analysis, the pitch accent on book should again
be able to license focus on the whole VP in suitable circumstances, since it
instantiates the following structure, which closely resembles (54) cited above:
(72) [VP v[ DP dNP P given]]FOC
According to the alternative line of analysis proposed in this paper, (69) at most
licenses narrow focus on a book:
18
(73) [VP v ƒdN ] FOC PP]]
As it turns out, (71) is actually a famous example by Lisa Selkirk (1996). Selkirk
adopts for (71) the analysis depicted in (72) and consequently claims that the
whole VP can be focused in this example in any context where about bats is
given. Somewhat surprisingly in light of the results from the previous section,
there is evidence that the verb bought can indeed well be part of the focus
licensed by a pitch accent on book:
(74) Mary only bought a BOOK about bats.
This sentence can well mean that the only thing that Mary did with respect to
bats was to buy a book about them. This indicates that the relevant alternative
set allows for variation in the resp. activity that has to do with bats:
(75) ƒMary [bought a BOOK [about bats]given]FOC„
FOC
 { Mary (did/does/will do) x with y about bats
| x an activity, y a suitable NP-meaning }
18I assume here for concreteness that [d N] form a DP-internal constituent. If not, the
following arguments have to be adjusted as to exclude the determiner from narrow focus.Elke Kasimir 46
At the same time, an analysis according to (73) is out, since in that case, the
relevant set of focus alternatives was too small:
(76) ƒMary bought [a BOOK]FOCabout bats„
FOC
 { Mary bought x about bats | x a suitable NP-meaning }
This seems to be a strong empirical argument for projection rules which respect
givenness. However, as it happens, (71) and (76) perhaps do not actually
instantiate the syntactic structure tacitly assumed so far, for consider:
19
(77) Mary only bought a BOOK yesterday about bats.
In (77), the PP about bats has most likely been extraposed. It thus could well be
that in (71) and (76) the PP has been extraposed too. The following illustrates
this option:
(78) Mary [VP bought [a book ti]]FOC [about bats]i
This is the analysis I want to propose for this example. I agree with Selkirk's
analysis that the VP is focused in this examples. That about bats is ignored for
the sake of focus projection I however attribute this to that fact that it has been
extraposed. The relevant rule could be stated as follows:
(79) Extraposed material, and the trace it leaves, is ignored in focus
projection.
What kind of example could help now to decide between an analysis based on
extraposition and (79) on the one hand, and an analysis based on givenness and
19 Since several reviewers doubted this: the following example has been judged fine in
appropriate contexts, and simuilar examples are discussed in Guéron (1980).Question-answer test and givenness: some question marks 47
focus projection rules which respect givenness on the other hand? As it turns,
out, not every [d N PP] structure allows extraposition, for consider:
(80) a. * Bill drank a GLASS yesterday of beer.
b. * Bill met the KING yesterday of Belgium.
Examples based on such DP's should not be amenable to an analysis according
to extraposition. Consider to this end:
(81) Bill drank a GLASS of beer. That is the problem.
implication: If Bill drank some other amount of beer, that wouldn't be a
problem. Nothing is said about activities other than drinking beer.
(82) Bill met the PREsident of Belgium. That is the problem.
implication: If Bill met some other representative of Belgian, that
wouldn't necessarily be a problem. Nothing is said about activities other
than meeting representatives of Belgian.
The analysis based on givenness would still predict that the VP can be in focus
in these examples. The focus alternatives should therefore include other
activities than drinking or meeting someone, as is sketched here:
{ Bill (did/does/will do) x with y of beer
| x an activity, y a suitable np-meaning }
{ Bill (did/does/will do) x with y of Belgian
| x an activity, y a suitable np-meaning }
The alternative analysis predicts a narrow focus on the NP in these cases, where
the activity is fixed to be drinking, meeting someone, resp.:Elke Kasimir 48
{ She drank x of beer | x a suitable np-meaning }
{ She meet x of Belgian | x a suitable np-meaning }
The intuitive meanings of (81) and (82) clearly favors the second analysis.
The very issue of the interaction between extraposition and information
structure clearly deserves a much more thorough investigation than could be
done here. In an still ongoing investigation undertaken by the author and Kepa
Joseba Rodriguez into the semantics and pragmatics of extraposition, one which
currently concentrates on Basque and Turkish, there is ample evidence that
extraposition interacts in rather complex ways with information structure. This
supports earlier observations on extraposition in English for instance by
Jacqueline Guéron (1980). There is by the way some initial evidence that at least
in Turkish and Basque, extraposed material can be "backgrounded" in some
sense which is well distinguishable from just not being in focus. So it may turn
out after all that the semantics and pragmatics of extraposition is the very
location where an independent pragmatic concept of givenness or so is
operative. The intuition that in examples like (71) from Lisa Selkirk some
orthogonal pragmatic input is involved in pitch accent placement might
therefore turn out to be still true in the end.
11 A final remark on focus alternatives
Throughout this paper, focus alternatives have been used as a means to
describe the semantic/pragmatic impact of focus. It has nowhere been claimed
that, say, focus alternatives somehow have to lie at the heart of the correct
semantic approach to focus, and an implicit claim to this end is also certainly not
intended from my side. But the descriptive use of focus alternatives is though
not totally innocent: if it turned out that some considerably simpler and less
expressive notion of givenness would suffice to derive the semantic/pragmaticQuestion-answer test and givenness: some question marks 49
effects of focus, as the meaning of only or that is the problem, this might
threaten the line of argument presented in this paper: opponents could argue that
givenness can replace focus alternatives and than claim that latter be furthermore
even worse than givenness. A discussion of this interesting issue was
unfortunately far beyond the scope of this paper; I can only say that I am
personally rather convinced that a concept of givenness like the one just
sketched can never be formulated; articles which are related to this topic include
Schwarzschild 1997, Geurts&van der Sandt 2004 and Jäger 2004.
12 Acknowledgments
I want to thank the participants of the Discourse Colloquium at the 7th of
December 2005 at the University of Potsdam for their critical remarks on many
of the ideas presented here.
References
Allerton, D.J. (1978). The Notion of "Givenness" and its Relations to
Presupposition and to Theme. Lingua 44: 133-168.
Beck, S. & Rullmann, H. (1999). A flexible approach to exhaustivity in
questions. Natural Language Semantics 7: 249-298.
Bonomi, A. & Casalegno, P. (1993). Only: Association with focus in event
semantics. Natural Language Semantics 2: 1-45.
Büring, D. (1997). The 59th Street Bridge Accent. On the Meaning of Topic and
Focus. London: Routledge.
Büring, D. (2003). Focus Projection and Default Prominence. In: Valeria Molnar
and Susanne Winkler (eds.): Proceedings from the Symposion
`Informationsstruktur -Kontrastiv'. Mouton De Gruyter.
Büring, D. (2004). Focus Suppositions. Theoretical Linguistics 30(1): 65-76.
Büring, D. (to appear). Intonation, Semantics and Information Structure. In:
Gillian Ramchand and Charles Reiss (eds.): Interfaces.Elke Kasimir 50
Chafe, W.L. (1976). Givenness, contrastiveness, definiteness, subjects, topics,
and point of view: 25-55. In: C. Li (ed.): Subject and Topic. New York:
Academic Press.
Chapman, S. (1998). Accent in Context. The Ontological Status and
Communicative Effects of Utterance Accent in English. Peter Lang
Publishing.
Dretske, F. (1972). Contrastive Statements. Philosophical Review 81: 411-437.
Dretske, F. (1977). Referring to Events. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2: 369-
378.
Féry, C. (1993). The Tonal Structure of Standard German. Tübingen: Max-
Niemeyer.
Geurts, B. & Sandt, R.v.d. (2004). Interpreting focus. Theoretical Linguistics 30:
1-44.
Ginzburg, J. (1996). Interrogatives: Questions, Facts and DialogueThe
Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory. Oxford: Blackwell.
Groenendijk, J. & Stokhof, M. (1997). Questions. In: von Benthen, J. and ter
Meulen, A. (eds.): Handbook of Logic and Language.
Gussenhoven, C. (1983). Focus, mode and nucleus. Journal of Linguistics. 19:
377-417.
Gussenhoven, C. (1992). Sentence accents and argument structure. In: I.M. Roca
(eds.): Thematic Structure: Its Role in Grammar. New York: Foris.
Guéron, J. (1980). On the Syntax and Semantics of PP Extraposition. Linguistic
Inquiry 11: 637-678.
Halliday, M.A.K. (1967). Notes on transitivity and theme in English. Journal of
Linguistics 3: 199-244.
Jackendoff, R.S. (1972). Semantic Interpretation in Generative Grammar.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Jäger, G. (2004). Alternatives or presuppositions? A comparison of the
Background-Presupposition Rule with Alternative Semantics. Theoretical
Linguistics 30(1): 111-122.Question-answer test and givenness: some question marks 51
Kaplan, D. (1978). DThat. In: Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, jr. and
Howard K. Wettstein (eds.): Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy
of Language. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Kaplan, D. (1978). On the Logic of Demonstratives. Journal of Philosophical
Logic 8: 81-98.
Kratzer, A. (2004). Interpreting focus: Presupposed or expressive Meanings? A
comment on Geurts and van der Sandt. Theoretical Linguistics 30(1): 123-
136.
Krifka, M. (1991). A Compositional Semantics for Multiple Focus
Constructions. In: Joachim Jacobs (ed.) Informationsstruktur and
Grammatik: Joachim Jakobs .
Krifka, M. (1992). For a Structured Meaning Account of Questions and
Answers. In: Frey, Caroline and Sternefeld, Wolfgang (eds.): Audiatur vox
sapientiae. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Krifka, M. (1995). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Polarity Items. Linguistic
Analysis 25: 209-257.
Kuno, S. (1987). Functional Syntax: University of Chicago Press.
Prince, E.F. (1981). Toward a taxonomy of given/new information: 223-255. In:
P. Cole (ed.) Radical Pragmatics. NPYP: Academic Press.
Rochemont, M. (1997). Phonological Focus and Structural Focus 29. In: P.
Culicover and L. McNally (eds.): The Limits of Syntax, Syntax and
Semantics.
Rooth, M. (1985). Association with Focus: Amherst.
Rooth, M. (1992). A Theory of Focus Interpretation. Natural Language
Semantics 1(1): 77-116.
Rooth, M. (1996). Focus: 271-297. In: Lappin Shalom (ed.): The Handbook of
Contemporary Semantic Theory: Blackwell.
Rooth, M. (1996). On Interface Principles for Intonational Focus. In: T.
Gallowayand S. Justin (ed.): Proceedings From Semantics and Linguistics
Theory VI. Ithaka: Cornell University.
Rooy, R.v. (2003). Questioning to Resolve Decision Problems. Linguistic and
Philosophy 26: 727-763.Elke Kasimir 52
Rooy, R.v. & Schulz, K. (2003). Pragmatic Meaning and Non-monotonic
Reasoning: The Case of Exhaustive Interpretation. Netherlands: Kluwer.
Schwarzschild, R. (1992). The constructiveness of associated foci.
Schwarzschild, R. (1997) Why some Foci must Associate. Rutgers University.
Schwarzschild, R. (1999). GIVENness, AvoidF and Other Constraints on the
Placement of Accent. Natural Language Semantics 7(2): 141-177.
Selkirk, E.O. (1996). Sentence Prosody: Intonation, Stress and Phrasing. In:
John A. Goldsmith (ed.): The Handbook of Phonological Theory. London:
Basil Blackwell.
Selkirk, E. (1984). Phonology and Syntax: The Relation between Sound and
Structure. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Truckenbrodt, H. (1995). Phonological Phrases: Their Relation to Syntax, Focus
and Prominence. Doctoral dissertation.
Elke Kasimir
Universität Potsdam
SFB 632 „Informationsstruktur“
Postfach 601553
14415 Potsdam
Germany
elke.kasimir @catmint.de